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INTRODUCTION
Laurence Peter once said that "[o]riginality is the fine art of remem-
bering what you hear but forgetting where you heard it."' Yet that clever
quip is itself unoriginal.2 Although there may be nothing new under the
sun 3-the arrangement of different bits of existing cultural matter in new
and interesting combinations is the source of much originality. Yet today
much of our cultural raw material is outside the reach of creators be-
cause of the orphan works problem. This problem renders untouchable a
large swath of existing artistic, literary, and other works because if a
work's copyright owner cannot be found to secure their permission to
use the work, then no one will ultimately use the work lest they risk li-
ability for copyright infringement.
Several solutions to this problem have been suggested, but most pro-
posals are cumbersome or incompatible with political and legal reality.
4
However, there might be a simple solution to the orphan works problem
that respects the rights of copyright owners while freeing up works for
which the rightsholders cannot be found. If a would-be user of a copy-
righted work completes a reasonable search in good faith and fails to
find the rightsholder, the user should be able to use the work. If she is
later sued, she should be able to defend in court by showing that she
diligently did her best to find the copyright owner. Copyright law does
not provide for such an affirmative defense right now.
Part I of this Article defines the orphan works problem and provides
examples of how it interferes with the use of creative works. Part II de-
scribes the causes and costs of the orphan works problem. Part III
outlines and critiques four of the leading proposed solutions to the or-
phan works problem. Part IV proposes a new and practical solution to
the orphan works problem.
1. Paul L. Allen, Mesmerizing, Martinizing came from namesakes, TuCSON CITIZEN,
November 22, 2004, at 7A (quoting Laurence Peter).
2. "Books serve to show a man that those original thoughts of his aren't very new after
all," Abraham Lincoln is quoted as saying. Quotable Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln Quotes,
http://www.quotablelincoln.com/quotedisplay.php?lastName=Lincoln&page=5 (last visited
May 17, 2005). Before him, Voltaire noted: "Originality is nothing but judicious imitation.
The most original writers borrowed one from another. The instruction we find in books is like
fire. We fetch it from our neighbor's, kindle it at home, communicate it to others, and it be-
comes the property of all." Zaadz.com, Quotes by Author-Voltaire, http://www.zaadz.com/
quotes/authors/voltaire/?page=l0 (last visited May 17, 2005).
3. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
4. See infra Part Ill.
An Orphan Works Affirmative Defense
I. THE ORPHAN WORKS PROBLEM
A serious problem faces those who seek to use creative works in
their scholarly research, commercial ventures, and personal lives. Gener-
ally, the U.S. copyright system grants automatic protection to creative
works at the moment of their creation, and that protection endures for
the life of the creator plus 70 years A person wishing to use a protected
work must get permission from the rightsholder or risk a copyright in-
fringement suit.6 Often the rightsholder is unknown or cannot be located.
Under U.S. law, copyrights do not have to be registered and notice of a
copyright claim does not need to be affixed to a protected work,7 so
tracking down the rightsholder of a work can be very complex, espe-
cially for older works. When someone who would like to use a work
cannot locate the rightsholder, the potential user often elects not to use
the work at all because of fear of possible litigation or criminal sanction.8
As a result, works for which the rightsholders cannot be found sit idle
even though at least some of these rightsholders would not object to the
use of their works and many of these works may be in the public do-
main. This disconnect between potential users and rightsholders is the
orphan works problem.
The Copyright Office recently requested public comments on this
problem and asked for possible solutions. 9 Over 700 public comments
and over 100 reply comments were filed with the Copyright Office, and
they included a large collection of anecdotes that illustrate the practical
impact of the problem and several proposed solutions.' ° The Copyright
Office specifically requested a definition of "orphan work."" This Article
defines "orphan work" as a work for which the rightsholder cannot be
located after a reasonable search in good faith.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
6. Id. §§ 502-06.
7. Since the Copyright Act of 1790, an author had to both fix notice on her work and
register the work with the government, among other formalities, to acquire copyright protec-
tion in the U.S. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 383-84 (6th ed.
2002). That changed with the Copyright Act of 1976, which eliminated formalities as prereq-
uisites to the grant of a copyright largely to comply with international copyright standards,
such as the Berne Convention. Id.
8. See, e.g., John van Dyke, Comment, http://www.copyight.gov/orphan/
comments/OW0002-VanDyke.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
9. Orphan Works Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739 (Jan. 26, 2005) available at
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/200570fr3739.pdf.
10. The Copyright Office has posted the comments and reply comments online at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan.
11. Orphan Works Notice of Inquiry, supra note 9, at 3741.
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For example, consider the scholar who researches primary materials-
perhaps letters from immigrants to the United States in the first half of the
20th Century-and he unearths a number of letters that have never been
published before. 2 His take on the letters is original and his work will ad-
vance the field. He wants to publish the letters in their entirety, along with
his commentary and analysis. After two years of research and two years of
writing, he presents a draft to his publisher. The publisher immediately
recognizes the commercial and scholarly value of the book, but cringes at
the sight of the letters. The publisher, seeking to avoid copyright infringe-
ment liability, says he will not publish the book without copyright
permission from the rightsholders of the letters, permission that the
scholar must obtain on his own. Some of the letters may be in the public
domain, but others may not.'3 Those who currently possess the letters do
not necessarily hold the copyrights thereto because authors of letters retain
copyright even if they send the original copy of the letter to someone
else. 4 Therefore, the scholar must try to track down the letters' authors. He
starts with birth and death records, which are not necessarily easy to ac-
cess. A handful of the authors are still alive according to public records, so
he tries to find their home addresses, but some of them are not listed in
public directories. Some of the letters may have been written anony-
mously, under aliases, or in maiden names, which makes it even more
difficult to locate the authors. For the authors who have died, the scholar
considers trying to track down the representatives of their estates." Apart
from the practical difficulties of locating these representatives, it is
unlikely that an author of a letter would order her final affairs in such a
way that distributes the property rights in letters that she sent to someone
else.' 6 The scholar considers hiring a private detective to locate the authors
and their heirs, but the cost is prohibitive. In the end, the scholar fails to
get permission for each letter. The value of his work diminishes and the
12. This example is based on the story of a Civil War researcher. Peter B. Hirtle, Un-
published Materials, New Technologies, and Copyright: Facilitating Scholarly Use, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 259 (2001).
13. Any work created before 1923 is in the public domain. Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright
Term and the Public Domain in the United States, available at http://www.copyright.
cornell.edu/training/Hirtle_PublicDomain.htm (last visited May 15, 2005). After 1923, it gets
more complex. Id.
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) ("Ownership of a copyright ... is distinct from owner-
ship of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any
material object ... does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in
the object.").
15. Copyrights may be transferred as personal property in a will. Id. § 201(d)(1).
16. See Duke Center for the Study of the Public Domain, Access to Orphan Films 2
(Mar. 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0596-CPD.pdf [hereinafter
Duke Comment].
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publisher loses interest. Copyright law has thus placed an impassable
roadblock on the scholar's path, even though it is not clear that the letters'
authors or their heirs would have objected to publication if asked.
Academic research is not the only area affected by the orphan works
problem. Photographs are also automatically copyrighted the moment they
are produced, so prints cannot be reproduced without the photographer's
permission. This is extremely frustrating to families who seek the assis-
tance of the local photo shop to scan and restore professional
photographs that may be the only link to their past.'7 Photo shops are
sensitive to the rights of photographers, and many will not make a copy
of a photo without the rightsholder's permission." This is good in theory
because it protects the photographer's ability to earn a living through her
craft. However, what happens when photographers die, or move away, or
change their names, or fail to print their names on the backs of photo-
graphs? The photos are untouchable, even if they are close to tatters,
unless the person in possession of the photos is willing to risk being sued.
Additional complexity is injected into this problem when the right-
sholder is a corporation. Over time, corporations reorganize, file for
bankruptcy, and change ownership. This makes the process of trying to
find a corporate copyright holder that much more complex. Additionally,
copyrights can be assigned to others, ° which leads to more confusion as
17. Comments to the Copyright Office document this problem. See, e.g., Chris
Spurgeon, Comment (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0054-
Spurgeon.pdf; Bernard Duffy, Comment (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/OW0056-Duffy.pdf.
18. E.g., Kelly N. Vaccaro, Comment (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/OW0l 56-Vaccaro.pdf. Vaccaro writes:
I currently work as a salesperson in a camera store. Just about every day I have cus-
tomers come in wanting to copy pictures. In some cases these images are still under
copyright. This is fine and I have no issues restricting obviously copyrighted im-
ages, especially when the photographer or company has wisely put a stamp on front
or back indicating the business and/or contact information. However, often there is
no stamp, no information, no way to find that original copyright holder. Often it's a
school or family or wedding picture from the 40s. or 50s. or 60s. I can't reproduce
it for my customer, because it's still under copyright. They have no way to find the
photographer, and often leave my store upset at me over something I can't control.
Many of my friends are photographers and I understand why copyrights are impor-
tant. But there are many cases, especially with photographs, where businesses shut
down, negatives are thrown away, photographers pass away or move, and it is near
impossible for someone to use that image.
Id.
19. Corporate copyrights have a "term of 95 years from the year of its first publication,
or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first." 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(c) (2000).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2000).
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assignments made in private contracts are likely not to be found anywhere
in the public record. For example, consider the case of fans of a defunct
rock band who get together to reproduce t-shirts and other merchandise
with the band's name on it.21 The fans contact the former band members
who are happy to let the fans print t-shirts, but they recall that an earlier
merchandizing deal stripped them of the required copyrights. When the
band was together it assigned some of its copyrights to a third party as
part of a merchandising deal, but the merchandise is no longer com-
mercially available. The merchandising company has long since gone
under, and so the fans must go without their memorabilia unless they
are willing to risk a copyright infringement suit. A recent example il-
lustrating the orphan works problem is the Google Print Library, a
partnership between Google, Inc. and several research libraries.22 To-
gether they plan to make available, through Google's searchable online
database, full- or partial-text scans of the collections of the libraries of
Harvard, Stanford, the University of Michigan, the University of Ox-
ford, and the New York Public Library." One scholar estimates that the
Google Print Library will contain the text of over 20 million books.24
Google intends to operate this database in compliance with U.S. copy-
right law by displaying full-text for those works in the public domain,
and partial-text for anything published post-1923. 25 However, the inclu-
sion of partial-text scans of books still under copyright has angered
some commentators who describe the effort as "large-scale infringe-
21. This example is based on a comment to the Copyright Office. Samuel Forrest Ar-
nold, Comment (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0057-
Arnold.pdf.
22. Press Release, Google Inc., Google Checks Out Library Books (Dec. 14, 2004),
available at http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/print-library.html.
23. Id.
24. Lawrence Lessig, Let a Thousand Googles Bloom, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at
Bll.
25. Press Release, Google Inc., supra note 22; Google Book Search, How will library
books look on Google?, https://books.google.com/supportparner/bin/answer.py?answer=-
20768&topic=1047 (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). Google Books explains:
If ... you search for Books and Culture by Hamilton Wright Mabie, for instance,
you'll be able to page through as much of it as you like, because its 1896 copyright
means the book is now in the public domain....
A book such as the 1924 copyright for True Stories of Pioneer Life by Mary C.
Moulton, on the other hand, may still be in copyright.... When you preview the
book on Google Book Search, you'll see only snippets of text directly around your
search term.
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ment.' '26 Google has "taken a very conservative stance and only books
pre-1923 will be considered public domain."" It does not seem that
Google will make any particular effort to contact rightsholders of
works published after 1923 to obtain permission to provide those
books' full text. Google's choice to restrict their treatment of books in
this way shows the uncertainty and difficulty of tracking down a work's
copyright status and its rightsholder.
Google has attempted to strike a balance between its goals of "[guid-
ing] more users to their local libraries; to digital archives of some of the
world's greatest research institutions; and to out-of-print books they
might not be able to find anywhere else[,]" with the need to "carefully
respect[] authors' and publishers' copyrights., 2' By choosing an artificial
definition of the public domain that stops at 1923, and by not attempting
to contact rightsholders whose works are still under copyright, the
Google Print Library's goal of broadly sharing works will not be fully
realized. This is a clear example of how the current copyright system
balance has tipped too far in favor of the rights of creators and against
the object of copyright law, which is "[to promote] broad public avail-
ability of literature, music, and the other arts. Copyright, like other
monopolies granted by Congress, "must ultimately serve the public
good' 30 even though it exists in part to "motivate the creative activity of
authors."3'
26. Jeffrey R. Young, University-Press Group Raises Questions About Google's Library-
Scanning Project, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 23, 2005, available at http://chronicle.com
free/2005/05/2005052301t.htm.
27. Google Print Library Project-Frequently Asked Questions, http://print.google.com/
googleprint/library.html (last visited May 15, 2005).
28. Id.
29. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). See also
Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) ("The primary objective of the Copyright
Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the
good of the public."); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("[Tjhe primary
object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.").
30. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984).
31. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526 (1994). See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor
of authors but 'to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."'); Aiken, 422 U.S. at
156 ("The immediate aim of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' crea-
tive labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.'); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)
("The copyright law... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
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II. CAUSES AND COSTS OF THE ORPHAN WORKS PROBLEM
Congress acknowledged the difficulty of tracking down copyright
holders decades ago.32 This difficulty, and the resulting orphan works
problem, is in large part caused by the structure of the U.S. copyright sys-
tem. While acknowledging the political improbability of wholesale change
to the structure of our current copyright system, this Article also suggests
that the existing system gives rise to orphan works. The costs of the or-
phan works problem are multifaceted, and affect consumers, creators, and
those who would use creative works. These costs provide impetus for a
change to the copyright system that solves the orphan works problem.
A. Causes of the Orphan Works Problem
• 33
Congress has "overhauled" the copyright laws several times, and
recent changes to the copyright system exacerbate the difficulty of locat-
ing rightsholders. The elimination of formalities and copyright term
extensions are two examples of these problematic changes.
3
4
1. Elimination of Formalities
For over 180 years U.S. copyright law required authors to register
their works in order to obtain copyright protection. 35 Authors were also
required to deposit a copy of their work with the Library of Congress, fix
notice of copyright protection on the work, renew copyright status after a
period of time, and comply with other formalities before they gained
protection. 36 The Copyright Act of 197617 did away with these formalities
in the U.S. and changed the conditional copyright system to an uncondi-
tional system.38 The elimination of formalities makes it more difficult to
32. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134 (1976) (discussing the need to set up a registry
of death dates to avoid the "problems of determining when relatively obscure authors died").
33. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT OV-1 (2004).
34. One scholar suggests three additional exacerbating factors: (1) the "nature of tech-
nology" encourages the creation of more works than ever before, (2) technology provides a
vast array of people with access to works, and (3) the short lifespan of modem media in com-
parison to the long copyright term. See Duke Comment, supra note 16, at 2-3.
35. 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 1 COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 408-12 (1994).
36. Id.
37. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 852.
38. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 494
(2004). Sprigman explains the difference between conditional and unconditional systems as:
[A] conditional copyright regime extend[s] copyright protection only to those who
[take] affirmative steps to claim copyright protection by registering their works,
marking them with notice of copyright, and renewing their rights at the end of an
initial term .... Unconditional copyright grants protection whether or not the work
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track down a copyright owner. 9 Although some private databases have
emerged to help potential users locate copyright owners, ' ° there is no
comprehensive list of copyrights and their owners.4' Requiring copyright
registration would help alleviate the orphan works problem because it
would provide information on copyright holders.4'2 However, this would
violate the Berne Convention.4 ' Additionally, registration without notice
would probably be insufficient to cure the orphan works problem be-
cause a registry is only useful if a potential user can track back to the
rightsholder from notice-like the author's name--on the work itself."
2. Copyright Term Extension
Copyright term extensions also contribute to the orphan works
problem by preventing works that would otherwise enter the public
domain from doing so until a later date. 45 The exact duration of copy-
rights are not specified in the Constitution, but the Constitution does
require terms to be "for limited Times. 46 Congress has the authority to
define terms,4' and in 1998 Congress enacted the Sonny Bono Copy-
right Term Extension Act, 8 which extended the term for all existing
is registered, marked, or renewed. Protection is automatic and indiscriminate, re-
gardless of the will of the author or his assigns.
Id.
39. See id. at 487 ("[F]ormalities created data about the existence and duration of copy-
right for the work in question, and about who owned the copyright.").
40. For example, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP), which serves as a clearinghouse for works of its members, gives access to its ACE
database on the Internet. This is "a database of song titles licensed by ASCAP in the United
States." ASCAP ACE Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ascap.comace/ACEfaq.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2005). ASCAP notes that although its database includes some informa-
tion about publishers, but "not necessarily the copyright owner, who thus may not be
represented on the ACE system." Description of ACE, http://www.ascap.com/ace/ (last visited
Sept. 27, 2005).
41. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 222-23 (2004).
42. See id.; Sprigman, supra note 38, at 487.
43. See infra Part II.B. 1.
44. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
45. The trade-off between copyright term and the public domain was recognized by
Congress as early as 1976. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 136 (1976) ("[W]orks of scholarly
value, which are now falling into the public domain after 29 years, would be protected much
longer under the bill.").
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
47. Id.; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-200 (2003) ("Text, history, and
precedent, we conclude, confirm that the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to prescribe
'limited Times' for copyright protection and to secure the same level and duration of protec-
tion for all copyright holders, present and future.").
48. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 11 Stat. 2827
(1998).
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works 9 Such a term extension keeps works out of the public domain by
increasing the number of works for which permission must be obtained
before someone can use them. As a result "tens of thousands of works
that had been poised to enter the public domain were maintained under
private ownership until at least 2019.,,50 Term extensions therefore in-
crease the number of works that will probably become orphan works
because the further back in time a user must search to find a rightsholder,
the more likely it is that whatever information about the rightsholder she
is able to obtain will be outdated and unhelpful. Additionally, "repeated
retroactive copyright term extensions mean that vast numbers of works"
are still under copyright even though their authors "had no reason to or-
der their affairs" in a way that took an extended copyright term into
account.' Copyright term extensions exacerbate the orphan works prob-
lem because as the term increases the practical difficulties of locating
rightsholders increase.
B. Costs of the Orphan Works Problem
The cost of the orphan works problem has at least three components:
the pass-through of a risk premium to consumers, a diminished public
domain, and harm to the preservation of cultural heritage. First, uncer-
tainty about orphan works may result in a risk premium that is passed on
to consumers. When someone uses a copyrighted work without permis-
sion, she runs the risk of being sued-or even indicted-for copyright
infringement. In the case of an orphan work, a user who attempts to lo-
cate the work's rightsholder, but fails to do so, must choose between
using the work and bearing the risk of legal action, or not using the work
at all. Commercial uses of orphan works might insure against this risk by
passing through to consumers a risk premium. 2 A new commercial work
incorporating older orphan works-such as the production of a new hip-
hop single sampling an old "race record"53 from the 1930s-would be
more expensive than it would otherwise be if the producers of the new
work did not have to insure against the possibility of litigation.
Second, the orphan works problem imposes a cost on consumers and
the public in general by reducing the supply of new creative works avail-
49. Chris Sprigman, The Mouse That Ate the Public Domain, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Mar. 5,
2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305-sprigman.html.
50. Id.
51. Duke Comment, supra note 16, at 2.
52. See COMPUTER ScI. & TELECOMM. BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL
DILEMMA 6 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA].
53. FRANK TIRRO, JAZZ: A HISTORY 138-39 (2d ed. 1993) (explaining that the term
"race record" was coined in the 1920s by the recording industry to designate black music).
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able because it discourages the creation of new derivative works. Locat-
ing the rightsholder of an orphan work may be so "complex and
frustrating" 4 that it forecloses use of that work.55 When uncertainty about
the copyright status of a work keeps it from being used, "the most im-
portant cost to the public comes from those new derivative works that are
not created because of the new author's inability to negotiate permission
from whoever owns the copyright."56 Society is therefore deprived not
only of immediate access to many new derivative works, but also of fu-
ture free use of the work because the public domain-where all works
ultimately finish-is made poorer.
Third, the orphan works problem harms efforts to archive the na-
tion's cultural heritage. As noted in a report by the National Research
Council, "[a]rchiving our cultural heritage and ensuring a record of
intellectual discourse are critical tasks for society.' 57 Film restoration
and archival present compelling examples of the cultural heritage cost
of the orphan works problem." Older films, recorded on fragile
media like cellulose nitrate and videotape, disintegrate over time be-
cause they are subject "[to] shrinkage, to outgassing that destroys the
film's emulsion and even to spontaneous combustion."59 Restoration of
disintegrating films requires copying the film to another medium,
which amounts to copyright infringement unless permission is obtained
from the rightsholder6 Archives that possess old films often do not
own the copyrights. 6' Additionally, films often contain multiple copy-
rights including, among other things, "the film itself, the script ... and
the soundtrack. ' 62 The process of tracking down the copyright holders
for each film is "massively time-consuming, and often simply
54. Kenneth D. Crews, When You Cannot Get Permission: Dealing with the "Dead End"
of a Copyright Quest (Aug. 29, 2002), http://www.copyright.iupui.edu/permdeadend.htm.
55. See Dennis S. Karjala et al., Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law
Professors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S.505 "The Copyright Term
Extension Act" 12 (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http://www.public.asu.edu/-dkajala/legmats/
1998Statement.html.
56. Id. at 11 n.14.
57. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 52, at 206; see also LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra
note 41, at 225 ("The noncommercial life of culture is important and valuable-for entertain-
ment but also, and more importantly, for knowledge.").
58. See Report of the Librarian of Congress, Film Preservation 1993: A Study of the
Current State of American Film Preservation, Volume 1: Report 5 (1993).
59. Duke Comment, supra note 16, at 2.
60. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 41, at 226-27.
61. Duke Comment, supra note 16, at 4-5.
62. Id. at 4.
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overwhelming. ' 63 The orphan works problem halts preservation efforts,
but does not halt the decomposition of the films themselves.
4
The current copyright system creates the orphan works problem and
is not equipped to solve it. Additionally, the costs of the orphan works
problem are real, practical reasons to work towards a solution.
Il. CRITIQUE OF LEADING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Legal scholars and other commentators have proposed several solu-
tions to the orphan works problem.6' This section will outline and
critique some of the leading proposals. Part IV will put forward a new
solution to the problem.
A. The Lessig Solution and the Public Domain Enhancement Act
Stanford law professor and cyberspace guru Lawrence Lessig was
one of the earliest academics to speak out loudly about the orphan works
issue. In a 2003 op-ed in The New York Times, Lessig proposed creating
a new copyright formality to ameliorate the orphan works problem.
66
Lessig developed his proposal further in his 2004 book, Free Culture.67
In 2003, Lessig's proposal was used as the basis for the proposed Public
Domain Enhancement Act (PDEA), which was introduced in the House
by Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.).
6
1
What Lessig suggested was "requiring copyright holders to pay a tax
50 years after a work was published.' 69 If the tax were not paid for three
years, the work would enter the public domain. 70 In his op-ed Lessig
suggested that the tax might be $50 per work.7' In his book he adjusted
that figure to $1 per work.72 Additionally, when a copyright holder paid
the tax, the government would record that fact in a register-presumably
63. Id.
64. Id. at3.
65. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
66. Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2003, at Al7.
67. LEsSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 41, at 248-53.
68. Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003). Under this act,
copyright would continue to inhere automatically in works upon creation, but works would
move into the public domain 50 years after their publication unless a $1 fee is paid to the
Copyright Office. Additionally, a $1 fee must be paid every ten years thereafter (until the end
of the normal copyright term) to keep the work from entering the public domain.
69. Lessig, Protecting Mickey, supra note 66.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 41, at 249.
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with the holder's contact information-so that someone wishing to li-
cense the work could easily find the copyright's owner. 3
This seemingly simple solution purports to help ease the orphan
works problem by moving works that are worth less than the $1 tax into
the public domain after 50 years.4 It would also create a register of
works that are at least 50 years old and for which the tax has been paid.75
Presumably, any work not in that register would have passed into the
public domain. There are several problems with the Lessig/PDEA solu-
tion that would undermine its effectiveness.
The imposition of any formality as a precondition to the enjoyment
of a full life-plus copyright term violates the Berne Convention. 6 That
treaty prohibits formalities that are conditional to the enjoyment and ex-
ercise of the minimum rights it adopts.77 One of those rights is that the
copyright term for works protected under the Convention shall not be
less than "life of the author and fifty years after his death."78 Thus, re-
quiring a copyright holder to pay a tax and register her work 50 years
after publication in order to enjoy the rest of the copyright term to which
she is otherwise entitled (life plus 70 years under current U.S. law)
would violate the Berne Convention.
The PDEA acknowledges this problem and attempts to overcome it
by making the tax and registration formalities applicable only to U.S.
authors.79 However, this is not an optimal resolution. Not only is it dis-
criminatory to U.S. authors-granting foreign authors superior rights-
but it also injects an element of confusion into the copyright system. If a
73. Lessig, Protecting Mickey, supra note 66.
74. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 41, at 249, 252.
75. Id. at 249.
76. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act,
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ip/beme/pdf/trtdocs-woOOl.pdf [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. Any such violation would also
violate the TRIPs Accord because Article 9 of that treaty incorporates Articles 1-21 of the
Berne Convention, with the exception of Article 6bis (which concerns moral rights). Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs.e/legal e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPs Accord]. Lessig seems to have con-
ceded this point. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 330 n. 14 (2001).
77. Berne Convention, supra note 76, art. 5(2).
78. Berne Convention, supra note 76, arts. 7(1), (6).
79. Public Domain Enhancement Act, supra note 68, § 3(a). The Berne Convention
only prohibits conditional formalities for foreign works; a signatory may still impose formali-
ties on its nationals. This is why, for example, registration is a precondition to filing an
infringement suit in federal court for American works, but not for foreign works. GORMAN &
GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 411.
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potential user discovers an apparently orphan work, there is no clear
method by which that user can determine if the work is by a foreign or
U.S. author. If the user checks the register created by the PDEA and
finds no registration for the work, that could mean either that the work is
in the public domain or that the work is by a foreign author who need
not register. If the user nevertheless uses the work, she assumes the risk
that it may be the work of a foreign author who will then come forward
and sue for infringement. Thus the uncertainty that is at the heart of the
orphan work problem is not removed.
The Lessig/PDEA solution also offers no clear method to determine
the age of a work. If a user discovers an apparently orphan work of un-
known age, she can check to see if it has been listed in the new register.
If she does not find it there, that could mean either that (i) the work is
not yet 50 years old, in which case the author is not under an obligation
to register, or (ii) it is in the public domain either because its term has
expired or because the author has failed to pay a tax and register at the
50-year mark. Again, the user employs the work at her own peril because
the crippling uncertainty inherent in orphan works remains.
Additionally, Lessig's proposal and the PDEA do not require that a
work be registered 50 years after its creation (when copyright protection
currently inheres), but instead 50 years after its publication.8 0 This is so
because of privacy concerns and because the date of publication is osten-
sibly more easily determined than the date of creation." However, this
has the effect of exempting unpublished works from the possibility of
early inclusion in the public domain.82 This aspect of the Lessig/PDEA
solution only compounds the already uncertain nature of orphan works
because potential users would also have to ascertain whether a work has
been published or not.83 For example, suppose that a researcher is prepar-
ing a film documentary and in the course of her research she finds in a
80. Lessig, Protecting Mickey, supra note 66, at A17; LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra
note 41, at 248; Public Domain Enhancement Act, supra note 68, § 3(c)(1).
81. Eldred.cc, The Public Domain Enhancement Act FAQ v 1.02,
http://eldred.cc/ea.faq.html (last visited May 11, 2005) ("[Tlhis proposal would only apply to
work that people initially intended to make available publicly. The alternative (50 years after
creation) creates very difficult problems of timing. I can know without asking you when a
work was published. I can't easily know when the work was created.").
82. Right now, published and unpublished works become part of the public domain
after the same amount of time because copyright protection begins at creation, not publication.
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
83. Publication is defined by the 1976 Act as "the distribution of copies or phonore-
cords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes
of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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library's archive a series of unmarked photographs that she would like to
use. The researcher has no idea who authored the photos or whether the
photos were previously published. If she does not locate an entry for the
photos in the register, this could mean either that (i) they were published
and the photos are now in the public domain because the author did not
pay the tax and register at the 50-year mark, or (ii) they were never pub-
lished, in which case the author was never under an obligation to register
and the photos are still copyrighted and not in the public domain. If the
researcher uses the photos in her documentary she assumes the risk that
they were never published and that their rightsholder may come forward
and sue her for infringement.
However, a notice formality would not only violate the Berne Con-
vention, but it would also place on copyright owners the insurmountable
burden of having to find and mark existing copies of their works. It
should also be noted that a registration formality makes little sense with-
out a concomitant notice formality, but neither the PDEA nor Lessig's
proposal include a notice formality.8 Although most authors will volun-
tarily fix notice on their works, some may not. If the identity of the
author or rightsholder cannot be easily determined from the face of a
work, it might be impossible to use a register to find that rightsholder.
Furthermore, the Lessig/PDEA plan would include a large up-front
cost for many existing copyright holders. All works published between
1923 and 50 years before passage of the Act (1955 if the Act was passed
today) would immediately be subject to the tax and registration require-
ment.85 While the proposed fee is only $1 per work, the total cost might
be onerous for individuals or corporations that have published very many
84. A notice formality is a requirement that a copyright notice be placed in a specified
location on the work. For example, the Copyright Act of 1909, which was in force until the
1976 Act superceded it, required that the word "copyright" (or abbreviation) or the familiar
copyright symbol "©", the name of the copyright proprietor, and the year of publication be
affixed to the work. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 § 19 (1909) (repealed 1976).
Books were required to have notice placed "upon its title page or immediately following[,]"
while periodicals required notice "either upon the title page or upon the first page of text of
each separate number or under the title heading[,]" etc. Id. Without notice on a work it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to look up the rightsholder of the work in a registry because one
would not know where to begin.
85. Public Domain Enhancement Act, supra note 68, § 3(c). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the PDEA provides that works would become subject to the tax formality "50 years
after the date of first publication or on December 31, 2004, whichever occurs later...." Id. If
the Act had been enacted the day it was introduced, this provision would have amounted to an
18-month grace period for existing works that were 50 years old or older. In addition to that,
the Act provides for a six-month grace period for all works.
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works during that 30-plus year period.86 Perhaps more burdensome are
the compliance costs associated with a large mass of registrations that
would all become due at once. In summary, the Lessig/PDEA proposal
violates the Berne Convention, imposes significant costs, and fails to
cure the orphan works problem.88
B. "New-Style" Fonnalities
A much more deliberate and compelling solution to the orphan
works problem was proposed by Christopher Sprigman, a fellow at Stan-
ford's Center for Internet and Society. 9 Sprigman correctly points out
that the orphan works problem exists in large part because the United
States eliminated formalities in its copyright system in order to accede to
Berne.90 He also acknowledges, however, that there is no chance that the
United States will withdraw from Berne or re-impose formalities as they
existed before the 1976 Act.9' Thus, his solution, which Sprigman calls
"new-style" formalities, surreptitiously reintroduces formalities in a
manner that attempts to comply with the letter, if not the spirit, of Berne.
Sprigman's system preserves the voluntary nature of registration, no-
tice, and recordation of transfer that exists in U.S. copyright law today
and introduces a new voluntary renewal formality.92 These new formali-
ties would apply to all authors, foreign and U.S. 93 If an author does not
comply with these nominally voluntary formalities, however, her work
becomes subject to a compulsory license that allows anyone to use the
work for a government-set royalty fee.94
86. For example, Universal Music Group alone owns or administers over 1 million
copyrights. Universal Music Group, Overview, http://new.umusic.com/overview.aspx (last
visited May 12, 2005).
87. Apart from the cost of fees, carefully executing a large number of registrations
would likely be very costly. The PDEA instructs the Copyright Office to develop a form that
must accompany the $1 fee. Public Domain Enhancement Act, supra note 68, § 3(c). The
eldred.cc FAQ promoting the Act acknowledges that "[for large companies holding many
copyrights, of course this could be a hassle-unless the government thought creatively about
ways to simplify the burden" and it suggests an online bulk-submission application. El-
dred.cc, supra note 81. But today the Copyright Office does not even offer online registration.
88. Professor Lessig is an outspoken critic of copyright term extensions, as evidenced
by his advocacy in Eldred v. Ashcroft. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). It may be
that the reason that his proposal fails to adequately address the orphan works problem is be-
cause the true target of the proposal is not the orphan works problem, but the long copyright
terms that Congress has enacted.
89. Sprigman, supra note 38.
90. Id. at 487-88; see also supra Part H.A.
91. Sprigman, supra note 38, at 488.
92. Id. at 555 (proposed renewal term not defined).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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This has the effect of eliminating the search costs that were created
when registration and other formalities where abolished. Under this
scheme, if a rightsholder does not register or renew her copyright, the
work does not move into the public domain, but neither does it become
practically unusable, as an orphan work, because of the fear of litigation; it
becomes available for use under a compulsory license. 9" In effect, by
choosing not to comply with the formalities, a rightsholder is signaling
that she values the work at or below the cost of compliance.96 The compul-
sory license fee would be set to approximate the cost of complying with
formalities.9 In this way, the compulsory license price is not simply an
arbitrary figure set by a government agency, but approximates the market
price of the works under such licenses.
This solution avoids many of the traps that befall the Lessig/PDEA
proposal. "New-style" formalities apply to works by foreign authors as
well as U.S. authors and so avoid discrimination and uncertainty. They
also apply to unpublished works of any age so that a potential user of an
unregistered work need not first determine if the work has been previ-
ously published. A notice requirement is also incorporated into these
formalities, thereby making registration truly useful. Nevertheless, "new-
style" formalities run afoul of the Berne Convention and are therefore
not a feasible solution. It also has other structural problems.
1. "New-style" Formalities are Incompatible
with the Berne Convention
The Berne Convention encompasses a position that is anathema to for-
malities. 9 Sprigman tries to overcome the Berne Convention's prohibition
95. Id. at 555-56.
96. Id. at 556.
97. Sprigman explains the approximate cost as:
Ideally, the royalty to license a work that a rightsholder has failed to register, notice,
reregister in the case of a transfer (i.e., record), or renew should be set to approxi-
mate the cost of complying with these formalities (i.e., the total cost of informing
oneself about the details of compliance and then satisfying them).
Id. at 555.
98. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE
21 (2001) describes this prohibition's effect:
The 1908 Berlin Act [of the Berne Convention] introduced several important
changes. The Berlin Act's prohibition of formalities as a condition to the acquisi-
tion, exercise, or enjoyment of copyright at least partially explains the subsequent
disinclination of the United States, with its notice, deposit, registration, and domes-
tic manufacturing requirements, to join the Union.
This is so, some suggest, because Berne stems largely from a continental natural rights
conception of intellectual property, and formalities are incompatible with such a conception.
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on formalities by making "new-style" formalities technically voluntary.99
The logical rejoinder, of course, is that "new-style" formalities are hardly
voluntary if noncompliance results in a loss of rights. Under Sprigman's
proposal, if an author did not comply with "voluntary" formalities, she
would lose the right to exclude others from reproducing her work. This
right to exclude is guaranteed by the Berne Convention and would be
compromised by "new-style" formalities." Therefore, compliance with
formalities under Sprigman's system is a precondition to full enjoyment
and exercise of copyright in violation of Berne.
Sprigman argues, however, that the right to exclude is not "totemic"
and exists only to ensure that the work can be economically exploited.''
If this is so, then as long as the author receives value for the use of her
work-through a default license, for example-without first complying
with formalities, she is conceivably not deprived of the enjoyment and
exercise of copyright.' 2 In effect the argument is that Berne does not
protect the right to exclude for its own sake, but only as a means to
profit.' 3 As Sprigman puts it:
An author who fails to comply with new-style formalities is
merely converting an entitlement that is initially protected by a
property right (the right to exclude, realized through injunctions
and infringement damages) into an entitlement protected by a li-
ability right (the right to recover revenues from use via a default
license).' °4
See, e.g. Sam Ricketson, The Boundaries of Copyrights: Its Proper Limitations and Excep-
tions: International Conventions and Treaties, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 56-94 (1999). Others claim
that the prohibition on formalities is simply a convenient way to avoid forcing authors to com-
ply with the formalities of every country in which they seek protection. See, e.g., Sprigman,
supra note 38, at 544. Regardless of the rationale, the fact remains that the Berne Convention
does not abide by formalities that are a precondition to "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
the rights of authors. Berne Convention, supra note 76, art. 5(2).
99. Sprigman, supra note 38, at 544.
100. The Beme Convention sets out an "exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction
of. . . works, in any manner or form." Berne Convention, supra note 76, art. 9(1).
101. Sprigman, supra note 38, at 557, 559.
102. Id. at 557.
103. Sprigman explains:
[T]he purpose of the copyright system is not to protect a rightsholder's property
right qua property right. The purpose of the copyright system is to protect a right-
sholder's ability to use his initial entitlement, which comes in the form of a property
right, as a lever to pursue the exploitation strategy best suited to his particular inter-
ests.
Id. at 559.
104. Id. at 557.
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This scheme makes compulsory licensing the default and requires
that authors affirmatively opt-out of that system by complying with for-
malities in order to avail themselves of the full set of property rights a
copyright holder automatically enjoys today. The key assumption is that
as long as economic exploitation of a work is protected for some period
of time, it does not matter for purposes of Berne compliance whether a
property or a liability system is used as the default.' °5 However, it does
matter.
The rights of authors that Berne contemplates include "the exclusive
right of authorizing the reproduction of [works]."' Berne presupposes a
property rights system, not a liability system. It requires that exclusive
rights inhere in all works immediately, and not after the author takes
some affirmative step.01 Perhaps Berne's drafters were unimaginative by
not foreseeing the possibility of a system that protects the economic
rights of authors through default compulsory licenses. More likely, the
continental natural rights conception of intellectual property that greatly
values authorial control informed their choice to enshrine exclusive
property rights as the norm.'08 Whatever the case, the fact remains that
the language of Berne is one of exclusive property rights.
Evidence that the Berne Convention encompasses a property rights
system is in the language of the treaty. Apart from moral rights,' °9 the
rights protected by Berne are exclusive rights."0 Compulsory licenses
are the exception with only two especially carved out instances."' Most
105. Id. at 558.
106. Berne Convention, supra note 76, art. 9(1).
107. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE 262 (2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/
about-ip/en/iprm (last visited May 12, 2005) [hereinafter WIPO HANDBOOK] ("[One of the
basic principles on which the Berne Convention rests] is automatic protection, according to
which [protection] is not dependent on any formality; in other words, protection is granted
automatically and is not subject to the formality of registration, deposit or the like.").
108. See Adolf Dietz, ALAI Congress: Antwerp 1993 The Moral Right of the Author:
Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199 (1995) (discuss-
ing the importance of moral rights in continental copyright law, which stems from a natural
rights-rather than a utilitarian--conception of intellectual property).
109. Berne Convention, supra note 76, art. 6bis (including an author's right to attribution
and to prevent certain modifications of her work).
110. See WIPO HANDBOOK, supra note 107, at 263 (listing "the exclusive rights granted
to authors under the Convention").
111. The WIPO handbook describes the exceptions:
There are two cases where the Berne Convention provides the possibility of com-
pulsory licenses-in Articles 1 lbis(2), for the right to broadcast and communicate
to the public, by wire, rebroadcasting or loudspeaker or any other analogous in-
strument, the broadcast of the work, and 13(1) for the right of recording musical
works.
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tellingly, however, is that Article 9(2) of Berne explicitly contemplates
that there might be instances when states will want to limit the exclusive
right of reproduction. ' 2 States can limit the exclusive right of reproduc-
tion and allow use of a work without the rightsholder's permission only
"in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not con-
flict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author."" 3 The logical implication
of this language is that outside "certain special cases" permitted by stat-
ute, legal use of a work is dependent on the rightsholder's express
permission because she is imbued with the exclusive right of reproduc-
tion. Therefore, a plain understanding of Berne shows that it is a
property rights, and not a liability, system. "New-style" formalities is a
liability system and therefore does not comply with Berne.
Despite the incompatibilities with Berne described above, "new-
style" formalities could be enacted as a "certain special case" under Ar-
ticle 9(2)."1 In "certain special cases," Article 9(2) allows limitations to
be placed on exclusive rights, but the radical limitations of "new-style"
formalities are likely outside its scope. Article 9(2) permits exceptions to
the exclusive reproduction right in (1) "certain special cases," provided
that the excepted reproduction (2) "does not conflict with a normal ex-
ploitation of the work" and (3) "does not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author."' Article 13 of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Accord)
includes similar language and extends Berne's exceptions to all of the
exclusive rights granted under Berne and TRIPs (e.g., the rights to create
derivative works, to authorize public performances, and to authorize
broadcasts).
16
The language of Article 13 and its three-part test was recently inter-
preted and applied by a dispute resolution panel of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in an action by the European Communities against
Id. at 264. Employing the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the fact that two com-
pulsory licenses are carved out suggests that others are necessarily excluded.
112. Berne Convention, supra note 76, art. 9(2).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. TRIPs Accord article 13 provides that "[m]embers shall confine limitations or ex-
ceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder." TRIPs Accord, supra note 76, art. 13. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supra-
national Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the "Three-Step Test" for Copyright
Exceptions, 187 Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur 3 (2001) (analyzing the meaning of
Article 13).
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the United States claiming that Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act"-a
provision establishing royalty-free compulsory licenses for the public
performance of radio or television transmissions of nondramatic musical
works for businesses, including restaurants and bars, below a certain size
or using certain "homestyle" stereo and television equipment--did not
qualify as a permitted exception under Article 13 of the TRIPs Accord."'
The WTO panel concluded that Berne Article 9(2) and TRIPs Article 13
were to be construed in a manner that avoided conflict," 9 and it ex-
plained the scope of each of the three elements of the Berne Article
9(2)/TRIPs Article 13 test.
Although some have argued that the "certain special cases" element
does not contain a constraint at all,'20 the panel found that each of Article
13's three requirements should be interpreted in a manner that avoids
any "redundancy or inutility."'"' It therefore held that the "certain special
cases" language imposes a separate constraint on exceptions that must be
satisfied before the other elements can be analyzed.2 2 The panel further
found that the "certain special cases" language requires that exceptions
be not just "clearly defined,"' 23 but also narrow:
[A]n exception or limitation must be limited in its field of appli-
cation or exceptional in its scope. In other words, an exception
or limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a quali-
tative sense. This suggests a narrow scope as well as an
exceptional or distinctive objective .... [A]n exception or limita-
tion should be the opposite of a non-special, i.e., a normal
124
case.
Applying this standard, the panel invalidated Section 1 l0(5)(B)'s
broad grant of compulsory licenses for nondramatic musical works for
businesses. It held that the exception could not qualify as "narrow" when
70% of all restaurants, 73% of all bars, and 45% of all retail stores quali-
fied for compulsory licenses under that section.2 5 However, the panel
upheld Section 110(5)(A), which grants compulsory licenses for dramatic
117. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000).
118. WORLD TRADE ORG., REPORT OF THE PANEL, UNITED STATES- SECTION 110(5) OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT ACT, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news e/news00_e/1234da.pdf [hereinafter Panel Report].
119. Id. T 6.66.
120. Sprigman, supra note 38, at 566-67.
121. Panel Report, supra note 118, 6.97.
122. See id. 6.160.
123. Id. 6.108.
124. Id. 6.109.
125. See id. In 6.122, 6.133.
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musical works and under which only 16% of restaurants, 13.5% of bars,
and 18% of retail stores qualified for royalty-free compulsory licenses. 6
"New-style" formalities fail to pass muster under this first element
of the Article 9(2) three-part test because a system that places limitations
on the exclusive rights inherent in all works can hardly be said to fall
within the plain meaning of "certain special cases." If the words "cer-
tain," "special," and "cases" mean anything, they at least describe a
subset of works and not all works.17 As the WTO panel stated, excep-
tions cannot apply to the "normal case,' ' 128 and a system of default
licenses would apply to all cases without distinction. Even if the works
counted as exceptions are only those that become subject to default li-
censes because their authors failed to comply with formalities, they will
likely still include over half of all works, 2 9 much more than could qual-
ify as "narrow in [a] quantitative as well as a qualitative sense.
''q
30
Because it fails the first element of the three-part test, "new-style"
formalities would not qualify as a permissible limitation on exclusive
rights under Article 9(2).' 3' Indeed, as Sprigman has acknowledged, the
compliance of "new-style" formalities with Berne turns on whether its
hostility to formalities and the regime of exclusive property rights it sets
out are merely suggestions about the best way to ensure the exploitation
of work:
126. Id. [ 6.142, 6.159.
127. Id. U 6.108-.110 (interpreting the meaning of these words).
128. Id. 6.109.
129. As every love letter and family snapshot is automatically protected by copyright, it
is impossible to accurately estimate how many works are created in any given period. How-
ever, it is probably safe to assume that even under a system of default licenses the number of
works registered will be a small fraction of all works created. This is because most works will
not have a value above the cost of registration.
Additionally, an empirical analysis of copyright registration data shows that only a small
number of works retain sufficient value after a few years of their registration to merit their
rightsholders' compliance with renewal formalities. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 234-49 (2003). Even if
we consider just the "new-style" renewal formality, only a tiny fraction of rightsholders of
initially registered works will choose to renew in order to enjoy the rest of their potential
copyright terms. Although this may be an optimal way to move less valuable works more
quickly into the public domain, it is not a solution that will qualify as a "certain special case"
under Berne/TRIPs because it includes too many copyrighted works.
130. Panel Report, supra note 118, 6.109. There is no reason to believe that the WTO
panel would have had a different conception of "narrow" if authors were being compensated
through a compulsory license; the key is the language of the text and the principle that Berne
only contemplates a property system.
131. Id. 6.160 (stating that "[the] three conditions are cumulative" and that failure in
only one would mean non-compliance with the treaty).
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[I]f the [Article 9(2)] exceptions provision is applicable, the
elements of the test are sufficiently indeterminate (at least as
they apply to default licenses, a mechanism that the Berne draft-
ers could not have had in mind when they formulated the Article
9(2) test) that the application of the test will involve not so much
testing new-style formalities under the formal elements as an
evaluation of whether the system of new-style formalities serves
(or undermines) the foundational principles of the Berne Con-
vention. If Berne is focused on protecting authors' ability to
exploit their works, new-style formalities will be compatible
with the Convention. If Berne is focused, instead, on enforcing a
particular property rule, regardless of authors' interests, then
new-style formalities may fail under the current text of the Con-
vention.'32
This Article has shown that Berne is decidedly a property rights system.
Therefore, "new-style" formalities are incompatible with the Berne Con-
vention, which makes their adoption highly unlikely.'33
2. Structural Critique of "New-Style" Formalities
Apart from the fact that "new-style" formalities do not comply with
the requirements of the Berne Convention-and could thus be enacted
only if they are made applicable just to U.S. authors-there are other
problems inherent in the structure of a default license system. These in-
clude questions about applicability, cost, and fairness.
First, it is unclear whether the system that Sprigman proposes would
apply only prospectively or if it would be retroactive to include existing
works. Either application would present problems. If the system applies
only prospectively, it does nothing to ameliorate the orphan works prob-
lem that exists today because no existing work would be subject to a
default license. Additionally, a prospective system would cause confu-
sion because it is conceivable that a user might not be able to ascertain
whether an orphan work she finds was created before or after default
licenses were enacted and would thus be forced to use it at her own peril.
It is more likely that "new-style" formalities would be enacted with
retrospective applicability. In that case there would be a large up-front
cost for many existing copyright holders. All currently protected works
would immediately be subject to the formality requirements. It is un-
clear how much registration would cost, but even assuming the current
132. Sprigman, supra note 38, at 568.
133. See infra Part IV.
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registration fee of $30 per work,'34 the total compliance cost might be
crippling for individuals or corporations that own many works.'35 Addi-
tionally, Sprigman's proposal calls for a notice formality.16 It would be
very likely impossible for all rightsholders to retroactively comply with
such a requirement; and if the notice formality were to be waived for
existing works, then the effectiveness of a registration formality would
be undermined. 37
Second, the very nature of orphan works is that a potential user does
not know who the rightsholder is. Under a default license system a user
of an orphan work would owe the compulsory license royalty to the
rightsholder of an unregistered work, but she would not know how to
locate and pay that person. She may also not know whether she owes any
money at all since it is conceivable that she cannot determine if the or-
phan work is in the public domain or if it is protected under a default
license. The possibility that a rightsholder will appear and demand de-
fault license fees would force her to keep money in escrow indefinitely
or to buy insurance. These are wasteful precautions, especially if the or-
phan work was in the public domain all along or if the rightsholder
would have gladly licensed the work at no charge. Sprigman does not
propose how to handle default license royalty debts to unknown par-
ties. 1
8
Finally, it is unclear from Sprigman's proposal how much time from
the moment of creation an author would have to comply with "new-
style" formalities before the work is subject to default licenses. Under
the 1909 Copyright Act, which included formalities, a work did not
achieve copyright protection until it was published.'39 Therefore, it was
clear that an author had to comply with formalities before the work was
published in order to secure copyright. The bright line of publication,
however, is not present in current copyright law because copyright now
inheres in a work at creation-at the moment it is fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression.' 4 Thus, a default license would have to attach to
works that had not complied with "new-style" formalities either immedi-
134. U.S. Copyright Office, Current Fees, available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
fees.html (last visited May 13, 2005).
135. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
136. Sprigman, supra note 38, at 555.
137. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
138. The orphan works solution proposed by Creative Commons (to which Sprigman is
a signatory) does address how default license royalty debts to unknown parties would be han-
dled. That proposal is addressed below. See infra Part III.C.
139. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 10, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (1909) (repealed 1976).
140. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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ately upon their creation or before the end of some grace period that is
not specified by Sprigman.
Sprigman's proposal seems to suggest that a newly created work
would be automatically imbued with copyright subject to a default 1i-141
cense. If an author wishes to claim the full spectrum of exclusive rights
currently allowed by law, she must affirmatively opt out of the default
license system by complying with a set of formalities. 4 2 According to
Sprigman, "[n]oncompliance with the new-style formalities would sub-
ject works to a perpetual and irrevocable 'default license,' with royalties
set at a very low level, thus effectively moving works into the public
domain."1
43
This proposal raises several questions: How much time does an au-
thor have to comply before her work is effectively moved into the
public domain perpetually and irrevocably? If the grace period were set
by statute, what rights does an author enjoy during the grace period? Is
her only recourse the default license? The answers to these questions
can be problematic.
Imagine that the grace period is six months. A student writes a poem
and turns it in to her teacher who reads it and later has the student read it
in class. She is so happy with the success of her poem that she intends to
comply with "new-style" formalities and then publish it in a magazine.
However, still within the six-month month grace period, but before the
student has registered her work, the teacher publishes the poem in his own
magazine without the student's permission and then hands the student a
check for the small default license amount. There would be nothing
unlawful about the teacher's actions because the poem was under a default
license at the time he published it, so he did not have to ask permission to
use it, even though he was fully aware of the author's identity.' 4 The
141. Sprigman, supra note 38, at 556 ("The default licenses that back new-style formali-
ties are a kind of penalty default rule, in that they are precisely the outcome that the owner of a
valuable copyright would not desire.").
Sprigman's proposal adopts the concept of "penalty defaults" proposed by Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner as gap-filling rules for incomplete contracts. Id. (citing Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 97-98 (1989)).
142. See Sprigman, supra note 38, at 556. By analogy to "penalty defaults" ("that are
designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default
and therefore to choose affirmatively a preferred contract provision"), a rightsholder will get
the result she does not want unless she take affirmative steps to comply with "new-style" for-
malities. Id.
143. Id. at 490-91.
144. The orphan works solution proposed by Creative Commons recognizes this prob-
lem and does not allow default licenses for the unpublished works of living authors. See infra
Part III.C.2.
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student author would have no recourse even though she never published
her work or in any way made it generally available to the public, and she
always intended to avail herself of full exclusive rights.
A default license system fails to completely address the orphan
works problem while creating an environment where authors would not
want to share their works until they have complied with all formalities
for fear of giving up their exclusive rights. This might have the unin-
tended consequence of undermining the openness of the Internet. For
example, much of the value of blogs comes from their immediacy. Blog-
gers can instantly type out and publish their works, secure in the
knowledge that they retain exclusive rights. Of course, they can always
waive these rights, perhaps by adopting a Creative Commons license,'
45
but making that choice does not slow down their publication. Under a
system where default licenses inhere automatically, bloggers might seek
to first comply with formalities before they publish, or they may reserve
their best ideas for less immediate but more secure forums of expression,
such as print publications.
Similarly, collaborative online enterprises might be stifled by "new-
style" formalities. The Social Science Research Network (SSRN) is a
network of scholars that "is devoted to the rapid worldwide dissemina-
tion of social science research."' 6 The value of SSRN lies in large part
on its commitment to encourage early distribution of research results on
the web. 47 By publishing their working drafts on SSRN, scholars gain
peer review and users gain early access to research and ideas they would
otherwise have to wait for in a print journal. It is not difficult to imagine
how default compulsory licenses might affect such a collaborative effort.
Neither must such efforts be as grand as SSRN. In 2003, Dan Gill-
mor, then a columnist for The San Jose Mercury News, published on his
website chapters of his book, We The Media, as he wrote them and asked
for editorial help from readers.4 8 It is unlikely many such projects would
thrive unless exclusive rights inhered automatically.
145. Creative Commons is a non-profit organization that provides templates for free
"some rights reserved" licenses creators can use to release their works. These licenses are
designed to retain some rights that inhere automatically under copyright, but give up others to
the public. Among others, there are Creative Commons licenses that allow free use with attri-
bution, noncommercial use, use without the right to make derivative works, and even a "no
rights reserved" license that effectively acts as a dedication to the public domain. Creative
Commons, Licenses Explained, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ (last visited May
11,2004).
146. Social Science Research Network, Home Page, http://www.ssm.com/index-sf.html
(last visited May 11, 2004).
147. Id.
148. Michael Bazeley, Professor's Online Publishing Experiment, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Mar. 16, 2005, at Business 1. Dan Gillmor's draft book chapters and reader comments
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Therefore, although Sprigman's proposal presents a number of co-
gent ideas, the proposal ultimately fails because it is not compatible with
the Berne Convention and because it succumbs to a number of structural
problems.
C. The Creative Commons Halfway Approach
Responding to the Copyright Office's call for comments on the or-
phan works problem,4 9 Creative Commons submitted a new proposed
solution to the problem.' ° Both Professor Lessig and Christopher
Sprigman are signatories to this proposal, which incorporates parts of
their respective solutions.'
Creative Commons notes in its comment that there are two possible
ways to deal with the orphan works problem:'52 (i) a case-by-case ap-
proach that considers the efforts that a potential user takes to locate the
owner of a particular orphan work, or (ii) a categorical approach that
uses general rules to separate orphan works from other works and "al-
low[s] the use of orphan works without the need to ask for permission or
the risk of copyright infringement."' 53 Creative Commons prefers a cate-
gorical approach because it "eliminates the need for judges to set
standards case-by-case for a reasonable search and eliminates uncer-
tainty for users.' 5 4 The Creative Commons approach is ultimately flawed
because, among other things, it cannot be implemented without the case-
by-case determinations it seeks to avoid.
1. Registration of Published Works
Like the Lessig/PDEA solution, the Creative Commons solution cre-
ates a registration formality.'55 Unlike the Sprigman solution, works are
automatically imbued with full exclusive rights upon creation, just as
copyright law does today.5 6 However, 25 years after a work's publication,
its rightsholder must register the work in order to retain her exclusive
are available at http://weblog.siliconvalley.com/column/dangillmor/archives/010092.shtm
(last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
149. See Orphan Works Notice of Inquiry, supra note 9.
150. Lawrence Lessig et al., Comments of: Creative Commons & Save the Music (Mar.
25, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphanlcomments/OW0643-STM-CreativeCommons.pdf
[hereinafter Creative Commons Comment].
151. Id. at 1.
152. Id. at 15.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 15, 17.
155. Id. at 16.
156. Id.
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rights.'" If the rightsholder does not comply with the registration formal-
ity, the work becomes subject to a default license for the duration of its
copyright term.'56 The proposal also calls for a new renewal formality 50
years after a work's publication.'59 Failure to comply with the renewal
formality also subjects the work to a default license.'60
Nothing in the Creative Commons proposal overcomes the issues
that make both the Lessig and Sprigman solutions incompatible with the
Berne Convention. 6'The proposal is more like Lessig's than Sprigman's
because exclusive rights are not immediately conditioned on compliance
with formalities-it is only the case that an author loses exclusive rights
after 25 years unless she complies. This does not save the proposal be-
cause full enjoyment and exercise of exclusive rights is guaranteed by
Berne for a full term of at least life of the author plus 50 years. 62 Mak-
ing enjoyment of a full term conditional on registration would violate
Berne's prohibition on formalities.
63
Assuming that the Creative Commons proposal passes Berne Con-
vention muster, it too is susceptible to structural critiques. For example,
the proposal does nothing to ameliorate the problem of works that be-
come orphaned within 25 years after their initial publication. An orphan
work, after all, is simply a work the rightsholder of which cannot be
readily ascertained after a reasonable search. It is conceivable that one
could find a 15-year old work that is nonetheless orphaned; the Creative
Commons approach provides no remedy for this situation.'9 Also, unlike
Sprigman's solution, the Creative Commons proposal does not call for a
notice formality. As has been pointed out before, a register is not very
useful unless works are marked in a way that allows them to be easily
identified in the register.
65
The Creative Commons proposal attempts to answer the question of
how a user would pay default license royalties if she does not know the
identity of the rightsholder, According to the proposal, "default license
fee[s] will be payable to an 'Orphan Fund,' where owners who did not
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 17.
160. Id.
161. In support of the contention that its proposed solution would not violate the Berne
Convention, Creative Commons submitted a copy of Sprigman's Stanford Law Review article
along with its proposal. However, this Article has already addressed why the system therein
would violate the Berne Convention. See supra Part III.B.
162. Berne Convention, supra note 76, arts. 7(1), 9(1).
163. Id. art. 5(2).
164. The solution proposed in this Article would take immediate and retroactive effect
upon promulgation. See infra Part IV.
165. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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register, and who discover uses of their work after the fact may identify
themselves and claim any monies paid to the fund for use of their
works."' Such a fund would be impractical and wasteful.
Many orphan works are actually in the public domain, but because it
is difficult or impossible to pin down their former rightsholder or their
date of creation, a potential user cannot know this for sure. Such users
might feel compelled to pay into an orphan works fund even though the
work they are using is really in the public domain. This is not only un-
fair, but a waste, because the money they contribute will sit in the fund
indefinitely with no chance that someone will properly claim it. It is also
likely that the rightsholders of many orphan works still under copyright
will not make any claims and money paid for these works will also sit
indefinitely in an orphan fund. This is precisely the case with state un-
claimed property funds, which currently have over $30 billion in idle
assets.1 67 Not only would the monies in such a large fund lay dormant
and unproductive, but its very inefficiency will also make it very tempt-
ing for Congress to tap into that fund.
68
If the Creative Commons default license solution were implemented,
the most efficient way to address the problem of money owed to un-
known rightsholders would be through insurance and not an orphan
works trust fund. Because claims will not be made on all orphan works
used--either because they are in the public domain or simply because
rightsholders will remain unaware of their claim-insurers would be
able to accept the risk of claims for a premium less expensive than what
users would otherwise pay into a fund. When averaged out over all the
policies sold, the total of claims paid out should be less than the total of
premiums paid to the insurer, with the difference being costs and profit.
166. Creative Commons Comment, supra note 150, at 17.
167. Ellen P. Aprill, Inadvertence and the Internal Revenue Code: Federal Tax Conse-
quences of State Unclaimed Property Laws, 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 123, 124 n.5 (2000)
(quotations omitted):
Folsom estimates that the states hold more than $30 billion acquired from private
parties, such as banks, insurance companies, and transfer agents. In 1997, Money
magazine estimated the number as closer to $35 billion. The federal government is
the largest holder of unclaimed property in the form of federal pensions, savings
bonds and tax refunds. The GAO found that federal agencies varied considerably in
their efforts to establish procedures for finding and returning amounts owed.
168. Many state legislatures are tapping into their unclaimed property funds to meet
budget deficits and to pay for investments in education. See, e.g., Jan Moller, Highway Project
May Gain Speed, Bill Finds a Way to Finance 1-49 Work, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE,
May 11, 2005, at 4 (New Orleans plans to use the fund to finance highway construction); Cy
Ryan & Kirsten Searer, State Expects Big Hike in Tax Revenue, Estimates Fall Short of Ne-
vada Lawmakers'Expectations, LAS VEGAS SUN, May 3, 2005, at Al (Nevada plans to use the
fund to subsidize college scholarships).
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However, although an insurance scheme would be preferable to a trust
fund, it still imposes wasteful costs on users of orphan works.
2. Notice of Intent to Use for Unpublished Works
Although the Lessig/PDEA scheme only applies to published works,
with the result being added confusion, 9 the Creative Commons proposal
addresses this shortcoming by creating special rules for unpublished or-
phan works. 70 While an author is alive, she retains exclusive rights to her
unpublished works.' 7' Once the author dies, however, a user can use the
work as long as they post notice of their intent to use the work.7 1 "If a
death date cannot be readily determined, the law should presume an
author's death 75 years after creation of the work in question."''7 Corpora-
tions receive 10 years of exclusive rights for their unpublished works
before they are subject to default licenses. 74 Of course, corporations can
always publish or register their works within the 10-year period and retain
their exclusive rights. 7 1 Similarly, heirs may retain full rights in an unpub-
lished work by registering the work within three years of the author's
death.
176
The Creative Commons comment explains the proposed intent-to-
use notice system:
For unpublished and unregistered works, a would-be user shall be
entitled to make a use if he (1) confirms the death of the author (or
that the date of the work's creation is within the statutory presump-
tion) for the works of natural authors, or the date of the work's
creation for the works of corporate authors; (2) confirms the expira-
tion of the three-year period for registration for the works of natural
authors or the 10-year period for the works of corporate authors;
and (3) posts a notice of intent to use for a period of six months in a
centrally-administered "Claim Your Orphan" website (such post-
ings will include a capsule description of the work, and an image of
a portion of the work sufficient to permit recognition-e.g., for text,
an image of the title page; for film, a still of a title frame, or a short
piece of streaming video). From time to time, the titles and capsule
169. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
170. Creative Commons Comment, supra note 150, at 18.
171. Id. at 19.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 18.
174. Id. at 19.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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descriptions of the works noticed on the Claim Your Orphan web-
site shall be published in the Federal Register.
77
However, the central feature of the orphan works problem is that a po-
tential user cannot identify the rightsholder of a particular work, which is
often the work's author. If one cannot identify a work's author, then one
cannot confirm that author's death, which is a prerequisite for a default
license under this scheme. When the date of death cannot be readily ascer-
tained, Creative Commons suggests, one can assume the author's death as
75 years after a work's creation.7 7 However, when the author's identity
and date of death cannot be ascertained, the work's date of creation will be
equally nebulous. This is especially true of unpublished works.
Furthermore, whether a user carried out a sufficiently reasonable
search in good faith to assure themselves that they could not ascertain an
author's death date (so that they could assume 75 years from the date or a
work's creation), will be a question that only judges will be able to answer
on a case-by-case basis, something Creative Commons set out to avoid.'
79
Similarly, deciding what is a reasonable assumed creation date for a work
that has no clear creation date will also be within the province of the
courts on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, given the availability of a web database of intent-to-use no-
tices, it is unclear what benefit regularly publishing the contents of that
database in the Federal Register will add. If heirs to the rights of unpub-
lished works have not taken notice of their claim via the presumably
searchable database, it is unlikely that they will read through what could
be hundreds or thousands of notices in the Federal Register in order to
acquire that notice. Publication of notices in the Federal Register would,
however, come at an additional cost.'
8°
Ultimately the Creative Commons proposal falls into similar traps as
the Lessig and Sprigman proposals, but it is even more complex, imposes
costs without clear benefits, and fails to address the entirety of the orphan
works problem.
D. The Canadian Approach
Canada's copyright law attempts to address the orphan works prob-
lem by allowing anyone who seeks permission to make use of a
177. Id.
178. Id. at 18.
179. See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
180. Beyond the cost of additional pages in the Federal Register, additional manpower-
perhaps at both the Copyright Office and the Government Printing Office-would no doubt be
necessary to manage this new system.
Fall 20051
106 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 12:75
published work and cannot locate the copyright owner to petition the
Canadian Copyright Board for a license.'' The Copyright Board
determines whether sufficient efforts have been made to locate the
owner.8 1 If so, the Copyright Board may grant a license for the proposed
use.' The Board sets the terms and fees for the proposed use of the
work at its discretion.184
Royalty fees collected are held in a fund from which the copyright
owner, if she ever surfaces and makes a claim, can be paid. 85 However,
the Board will often "order[] that the payment of the royalties fixed by
the licence be made directly to a copyright collective society that would
normally represent the unlocatable copyright owner.' '86 These collective
societies undertake to pay copyright owners that make a claim up to five
years after the expiry of the license. 7 But if no copyright owner surfaces
after that time, "the Board allows the copyright collective society to dis-
pose of the royalties as it sees fit for the general benefit of its
members.'
8
As other commentators have noted,'8 9 the Canadian system has sev-
eral drawbacks. First, their system applies only to published works,
which means that it leaves unaddressed unpublished works and works
the publication status of which cannot be confirmed either way.' 9° Sec-
ond, potential users must first file a petition with a government agency
for every work they intend to use-even for works potentially in the pub-
lic domain. Not only is this a waste of a user's time and effort for works
in the public domain or which will never result in claims, but if the sys-
tem becomes popular and a large number of applications are filed, pre-
clearing every orphan work use will likely be costly and inefficient.' 9'
181. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 77 (1985) (Can.).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, UNLOCATABLE COPYRIGHT OWNERS BROCHURE,
available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable/brochure-e.html (last visited May 12, 2005).
186. Id. Collective societies are much like performing rights societies such as ASCAP
and BMI. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 569-70.
187. COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, supra note 185; Copyright Act, supra note 181,
§ 77.
188. COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, supra note 185.
189. Creative Commons Comment, supra note 150, at 15-16. See also, Duke Comment,
supra note 16, at 5-6.
190. It is also conceivable that a work in the public domain may have attached to it a
recent publication date. Therefore, the fact that a work is published does not help determine
whether a work is presently subject to copyright protection.
191. More likely, this bureaucratic approach will fail to draw many users. In the 14 years
it has been managing this system, the Canadian Copyright Board has only received 182 re-
quests and has issued 176 licenses. Copyright Board of Canada, Unlocatable Copyright
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Lastly, the payment of fees to collective societies-which, no doubt, will
in many cases be for works in the public domain-is in effect a tax on
the creative users of orphan works that benefits society members who
have created nothing related to the orphan work and have done nothing
to deserve such a windfall.'92
IV. PROPOSAL: AN ORPHAN WORKS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Although the elimination of formalities and the extension of copy-
right terms may well be the culprits responsible for the orphan works
problem, U.S. membership in the Berne Convention and the recently
recognized constitutionality of term extensions' 93 are facts that make it
highly unlikely that Congress will "reformalize" copyright or shorten its
term any time soon. This Article aims to describe a solution to the or-
phan works problem that is compatible with both political reality and the
existing copyright system. To that end this solution applies to all works,
foreign and domestic, but does not come into conflict with international
obligations. It eschews any mandatory formalities and does not rely on
compulsory licenses, and it gives rightsholders and users control over
their respective legal rights.
A. Structure of the Orphan Works Affirmative Defense
This Article proposes a new affirmative defense to infringement ac-
tions similar to the fair use affirmative defense.'" Under Section 107 of
the Copyright Act, if a user uses a copyrighted work and is sued for in-
fringement by the rightsholder, the user may defend by claiming fair
use.' 95 The statute includes a non-exclusive list of four factors that a court
must consider in determining whether the use in question is a fair use.196
Owners Licenses Issued, http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable/licences-e.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2006); Copyright Board of Canada, Unlocatable Copyright Owners-Other Decisions
(Applications Denied), http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable/otherdecisions-e.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2006).
192. Duke Comment, supra note 16, at 6-7.
193. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003) ("Guided by text, history, and prece-
dent, we cannot agree ... that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically
beyond Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause.").
194. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
195. See id.; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (finding a rap
song by 2 Live Crew based on a song by Roy Orbison was a parody entitling it to the fair use
defense).
196. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107(1)-(4) (2000). The factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use...
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
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If the court finds fair use, the user will not be liable for infringement
even though she copied a copyrighted work.' 97
The proposal is that if, after a reasonable search in good faith, no
copyright holder for a work is found, the work may be used without the
user being subject to liability. A user who is subsequently sued for in-
fringement will be able to defend by claiming a codified orphan works
defense.'" The user will have to convince a court that after a reasonable
search in good faith she was not able to locate the rightsholder, thus
making the work orphaned.'" If the court finds that the search was in fact
reasonable and carried out in good faith, and that no rightsholder was
found, then the work will be deemed orphaned at the time it was used
and the user will not be liable for infringement. As with the fair use stat-
ute, there should be a codified non-exclusive list of factors that a court
will consider in determining whether the user-defendant carried out a
reasonable search in good faith.2°
If a user successfully asserts this defense, she will not face dam-
ages, will not be subject to injunction, and her "infringing" material
will not be impounded. 3 However, any future uses of the work will be
subject to a compulsory license with royalties set by statute.2 4 For exam-
ple, suppose that a user includes an essay that is an orphan work in a
compilation of essays and she prints 10,000 copies of the book. She sells
1,000 copies and then the rightsholder of the essay appears and sues her
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used... ;and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work ....
Id.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
198. Congress would ideally place the orphan works affirmative defense alongside fair
use in the Copyright Act.
199. The authors acknowledge that there may be situations wherein a potential user tries
to contact a rightsholder, but the rightsholder is non-responsive. If the potential user decides to
use the work nonetheless, and the rightsholder appears and sues for infringement, the user can
still assert the orphan works affirmative defense. To be successful, however, the user must
show that she took all reasonable steps to get permission from the rightsholder. Preventing a
user from claiming this affirmative defense in this situation would undermine its purpose be-
cause a potential user may not be able to tell whether she located the appropriate rightsholder
if that rightsholder is non-responsive.
200. See infra Part IV.B.
201. Damages and attorney's fees are remedies for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 504-05 (2000).
202. Injunction is a remedy for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
203. An infringer's copyrighted material may be impounded or destroyed. 17 U.S.C.
§ 503 (2000).
204. For example, these could be set at a certain percentage of profits, or a per-use roy-
alty.
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for infringement. If the user successfully asserts the orphan works af-
firmative defense, she will not have to pay damages for the 1,000 copies
she has already distributed, nor will she be enjoined from selling the
other 9,000 copies she possesses. °3 However, she will have to pay a
statutorily set royalty for any of those 9,000 that she sells or distributes
in the future. Additionally, the user in question and all future potential
users will have to ask permission from the rightsholder to use the work
in future derivative works.
An orphan works affirmative defense would encourage the use of
orphan works by significantly reducing the fear of automatic and harsh
penalties for infringement. At the moment, copyright law does not con-
sider a user's efforts to locate a rightsholder a mitigating factor to
infringement. Copyright litigation over the use of an orphan work may
be unlikely,2  but the fear of harsh penalties is often sufficient to prevent
the use of orphan works. The possibility of an affirmative defense would
reduce that fear2°7 and would allow users to use a work even though the
users are unable to locate the rightsholder.
At the same time, this proposal gives rightsholders an incentive to at-
tach contact information to works they deem to be of value. Under the
current copyright system, a rightsholder may fix notice on her work if
she wishes, but there is little incentive to do so. Under this proposal, a
rightsholder who values her copyright will try to insure against an or-
phan works defense by registering her work and affixing notice to it.
Doing so would make it difficult, if not impossible, for an infringement
defendant to claim the orphan works defense because notice and regis-
tration information would be available to make it more practical to track
down the rightsholder. Rightsholders could, among other things, volun-
tarily register with the Copyright Office or with private registries and
place on their work whatever form of notice they believe is most appro-
priate. How many steps to take-from none to very many-is a matter of
205. Under this proposal, the user would not have to account for the first 1,000 units.
This rule is meant as an incentive to rightsholders who value their work to take measures to
ensure that they will not face a successful orphan works defense. Also, this rule avoids com-
peling users to hedge against liability by either purchasing insurance or placing money in
escrow.
206. The use of most orphaned works today would probably not result in litigation be-
cause (i) in many cases, unbeknownst to the user, the works are in the public domain, (ii) the
rightsholder does not know that they are a rightsholder and will never discover that they are,
or (iii) the rightsholder does not object to the use when they discover it.
207. Some risk would remain because the user would have to do enough of a search to
show a court that they had conducted a reasonable search in good faith. It is always possible
that a court would not agree, which is what sometimes happens when defendants claim fair
use. However, some cover for orphan works users is surely better than none, and the factors in
the statute should be crafted to give search guidance to potential users. See infra Part IV.B.
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discretion for the rightsholder and the choice will no doubt be driven by
the value she places on her work.
Similarly, how extensive a search to conduct before deciding to use
an orphan work is a matter of discretion for the user, and that decision
will be driven by her tolerance for risk and how much she is willing to
spend. A user who is fairly convinced that an orphan work she plans to
use is in the public domain might conduct a perfunctory search and ac-
cept the risk that an orphan works defense might later fail in court, while
a highly risk averse user might decide to conduct a very expensive and
extensive search (including, for example, several display ads in the New
York Times) that no court would find unreasonable. After a time, courts,
interpreting the statute, will make clear what qualifies as a reasonable
search for a successful orphan works defense.0 8 Users could then decide
for themselves how close to approximate, or exceed, that standard.
Private firms (perhaps the very same firms offering private registra-
tion to rightsholders) might begin to offer search services to potential
users at different prices correlated to more or less extensive searches.
This would be similar to existing real estate title search companies that
scour public records for title information. Such search firms might even
offer insurance in the form of a guaranteed search. If such a search does
not hold up in court as a defense, the user would be indemnified for
damages stemming from liability.
B. A Reasonable Search in Good Faith
Mirroring the affirmative defense of fair use in Section 108,209 the
copyright statutes should include a non-exclusive list of factors that a
fact-finder might consider when determining whether a search was rea-
sonable and in good faith. These factors might include:
i. Whether there is notice on the work. If there is no notice on
the work, it will be difficult for the plaintiff-rightsholder to
rebut the orphan works defense because the work itself did
not provide the defendant-user with a starting point.
208. Admittedly, courts have often applied the fair use doctrine in a contradictory man-
ner. 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2005).
Some users have avoided making use of copyrighted works even though their use is very
likely protected by the fair use standard for fear of expensive litigation or a surprising judg-
ment. LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 41, at 95-99. If enacted, the orphan works
affirmative defense proposed in this Article might well fall prey to contradictory interpreta-
tions by the courts just as the fair use defense has. However, any statutory solution is
vulnerable to judicial misapplication. Better drafting or a clearer statement of congressional
intent could ameliorate potential misinterpretations of such a statute.
209. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).
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ii. Whether the defendant-user reasonably attempted to use no-
tice to try to locate the plaintiff-rightsholder. If notice was
fixed to the work, but the defendant-user did not reasonably
pursue that lead, it will be less likely that the defendant-user
will be able to show a reasonable search in good faith.
iii. Whether the user searched the Copyright Office's register and
other relevant databases-especially industry specific
sources.
iv. Whether the user followed up on the leads she found from her
efforts to locate the rightsholder.
v. Whether the user published her intent to use the work. Pub-
lishing intent-to-use might not be ideal for someone who
prefers to keep their research or commercial developments to
themselves. However, this-like the other considerations
listed above-is not required. It is merely one way a user can
show that she tried to locate the rightsholder.
These factors are just a starting point for a fact-specific inquiry. As
with fair use, courts are free to add to these factors and give different
weights to them in their quest to determine whether a particular search
was reasonable and in good faith.
C. Advantages of the Affirmative Defense Solution
This proposal has several advantages over other proposals submitted
in response to the Copyright Office's notice of inquiry. First, unlike other
leading proposals, this proposal does not violate international treaty ob-
ligations-such as those of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
Accord-because it fits into the existing copyright system without re-
quiring mandatory formalities. Whatever steps a rightsholder decides to
take to register or fix notice on a work, this solution is truly voluntary,
unlike other proposals that would strip full copyright protection from
works that are not formally renewed or registered.
Second, unlike those proposals, this proposal does not add to the
federal bureaucracy. However, private "reasonable search" firms may
emerge that will strive for efficiency and accuracy as they compete
against each other. The establishment of an ICANN-like registry may
help users of orphan works show their efforts to locate rightsholders, and
may help connect potential users with the rightsholders they seek.20
210. Such a database would be useful to rightsholders and potential users alike. Right-
sholders who wish to provide information that would license their works and also help
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Third, this proposal does not require rightsholders to fix notice on
their works, register, or record transfers with the Copyright Office or
other private databases. Instead, this proposal encourages rightsholders
to create information that will lower transactions costs-something that
our current system of automatic copyrights fails to do. Under this pro-
posal, rightsholders-who are in the best position to know the value of
their own works-have full control of how many steps they would like to
take, and to what extent, thus yielding the optimum set of protective
measures for each work.
Fourth, the extent of the search for an unknown author is a matter of
discretion for the user under this proposal. Depending on her sensitivity
to risk, she can undertake a more or less in-depth search to achieve rea-
sonableness. Of course, factors set out by statute and how the courts
subsequently apply them will be guides, but would-be users of orphan
works are ultimately in control of how much searching they will under-
take and how much risk they are willing to accept.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, this proposal is politically vi-
able. It does not overhaul our existing copyright system and it does not
challenge international law. Additionally, this proposal is an immediate
solution; it is retrospective in scope because it applies to all existing or-
phan works, and it does not require rightsholders to take any new
affirmative steps, such as renewal and payment of renewal fees, to secure
full protection of their existing copyrights. Failure to prevail in an in-
fringement suit does not strip the rightsholder of his claim to the work,
and future users of a litigated work will be hard-pressed to invoke the
orphan works defense. "
preempt an orphan works defense could choose to register and record transfers of their works.
At the same time, a potential user might choose provide notice of her intent to use the work by
publishing notice to that effect on the database.
The database might function like the Domain Name System (DNS) for website names
and addresses. See generally BRADEN COX & RUDY ROUHANA, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE, REPLY COMMENTS OF THE COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (May. 9, 2005),
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/reply/OWR0109-CEI.pdf. The DNS is managed
by the non-profit Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which
allows various competing private registrars around the world to sell domain names. ICANN,
ICANN Information, http://www.icann.org/general (last visited Feb. 18, 2006). A private
copyright registry and intent-to-use database might function in a similar way, with multiple
companies acting as competing registrars for one central copyright database.
211. Under our proposal, when a rightsholder brings a copyright infringement suit, that
rightsholder will have mitigated the orphan status of her work because works must be regis-
tered with the Copyright Office before a suit can be brought. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (2000)
("[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted
until registration of the copyright claim has been made.").
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CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the orphan works problem undermines
the purpose of copyright law, which is "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence"212 in order to ensure "broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts."2 '3 The orphan works problem stifles this goal by put-
ting a large swath of the public domain in doubt and by making it
practically impossible to locate many rightsholders to license their
works. Some have suggested solutions that require an overhaul of U.S.
copyright law, but these solutions do not adequately address the orphan
works problem and are unlikely to gain traction because of the political
realities of U.S. and international copyright law. Recognizing this, this
Article proposes a safe harbor from copyright infringement liability for
those who conduct a reasonable search in good faith for a work's copy-
right holder before using the work. This proposal takes the form of an
affirmative defense that slides seamlessly into existing copyright law.
Most importantly, this proposal promises to remove the unfortunate
choice between using an orphan work and bearing the risk of infringe-
ment litigation, or abstaining from the very derivative use that the
copyright laws are intended to encourage.
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
213. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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